This paper develops an economic theory of empire building. This theory addresses the choice among three strategies that empire builders historically have used. We call these strategies Uncoerced Annexation, Coerced Annexation, and Attempted Conquest. The theory yields hypotheses that relate the choice among these strategies to such factors as the economic gains from imperial expansion, the relative effectiveness of imperial armies, the costs of projecting imperial military power, and liquidity constraints on Þnancing imperial armies. This theory also yields hypotheses about the scope of imperial ambitions. The paper uses examples from the history of the Roman, Mongol, Ottoman, and Nazi German empires to illustrate the applicability of the theory.
This paper develops an economic theory of empire building. This theory addresses both the choice among strategies that can be used to expand an empire as well as the scope of imperial ambitions. The paper uses examples from the history of the Roman, Mongol, Ottoman, and Nazi German empires to illustrate the applicability of the theory.
To focus the analysis, we consider the following story: The Romans are thinking about expanding their empire by incorporating a country now ruled by Barbarians. Historical accounts suggest that the Romans, like other empire builders, can choose among three different strategies.
In an Uncoerced Annexation the Romans compensate the Barbarians sufficiently to induce the Barbarians to agree to the annexation of their country by Rome. This strategy requires that incorporating the country into the Roman empire would yield either economic or military advantages and that the Romans share these gains with the Barbarians. The attraction of this strategy to the Romans is that it avoids the expense of sending Legions either to threaten or to attempt to conquer the Barbarians.
In a Coerced Annexation the Romans induce the Barbarians to agree to the annexation of their country under the threat that the Romans will attack and try to conquer the country.
This strategy requires the Romans to send Legions of sufficient strength to the borders of the Barbarian country that the Barbarians decide to capitulate rather than to resist the Romans. The attraction of this strategy to the Romans is that it avoids having to share the gains from annexation with the Barbarians.
In an Attempted Conquest the Romans attack the Barbarian country. This strategy is cheaper than the strategy of Coerced Annexation. It requires sending Legions to the Barbarian country, but fewer Legions that would be necessary to induce the Barbarians to capitulate. But, this strategy is risky in that an Attempted Conquest can fail.
Our theory assumes that the Romans will employ any one of these strategies only if its expected value to the Romans is both positive and at least as large as the expected value to the Romans of any other strategy. If none of these strategies have a positive expected value, then the Romans will not attempt to incorporate the Barbarian country into the Roman empire. 1
Uncoerced Annexation
Let ω denote the present value of the expected stream of rents that the Barbarians receive as rulers of the country, and let Ω denote the expected gross present value to the Romans of annexing the country, where Ω = k ω, k ≥ 0. If k is larger than one, then the Romans expect that they can proÞtably compensate the Barbarians for agreeing to annexation by offering the Barbarians a stream of payments whose present value is at least as large as ω.
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The factor k could be larger than one for a variety of reasons. One set of possibilities is directly economic. For example, Roman rule could bring more efficient public administration.
It is also possible that as a part of the Roman empire or as an ally of Rome the country would have expanded trading opportunities.
Another set of possibilities is military and, hence, indirectly economic. For example, by annexing the Barbarian country the Romans could gain either access to resources or geopolitical advantages that would make it easier either to defend the existing borders of their empire or to incorporate other desirable countries into their empire.
1 A related paper by Ronald Findlay (1996) develops an economic analysis of the size of empires. Findlay's model abstracts from the distinction between annexation and conquest, which is the main concern of the present paper. Also, Findlay treats territorial expansion as a continuous choice variable, rather than modeling the incorporation of discrete countries together with their populations into an empire, as in the present paper.
2 The formal arrangements of an Uncoerced Annexation can range from direct Roman rule to an alliance with Rome under Roman leadership. If, as is likely, the Romans and the Barbarians doubt the credibility of each other's commitments, then each party can ensure the performance of the other party by making its own obligations, as well as the prerogatives of the other party, conditional on the other party meeting its obligations. As we will see, Roman history reveals that in fact conditionality was an important component of Uncoerced Annexation.
Let R A denote the expected value to the Romans of a strategy of Uncoerced Annexation.
Allowing for the possibility that k is larger than one, we have
In equation (1), R a equals the difference between the expected gross present value to the Romans of annexing the country and the present value of the compensation that the Romans pay to the former Barbarian rulers.
Coerced Annexation or Attempted Conquest
Let Q denote the probability, as perceived by both the Romans and the Barbarians, that, if the Romans send Legions to the Barbarian country, then they will successfully incorporate the Barbarian country into the Roman empire. Let g denote the size of the Legions that the Romans send to the country, and let h denote the amount of resources that the Barbarians allocate to defending their country from the Roman threat. Assume that, as in a standard contest-success function,
Equation (2), together with the parameter θ, maps g and h into the perceived probability, Q. The value of θ depends on anticipations or perceptions of the factors that determine the effectiveness of Roman Legions against Barbarian defenses. These factors can include the effectiveness of the military tactics that the adversaries employ, the quality of their training, equipment, and leadership, and the amounts of popular support and support from third parties that they enjoy.
According to equation (2) 
Assume that in choosing h the Barbarians take g as given. This assumption implies that a Roman decision to allocate resources to sending Legions to the country is irreversible.
In effect, this model assumes that the Romans are a Stackelberg leader.
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From equations (2) and (3) the solution to the Barbarians' choice problem is
Equation (4) the Romans send Legions to the country, then they choose g to maximize R C , where
In choosing g the Romans take into account both the direct effect of g on Q, as given by equation (2), as well as the indirect effect on g on Q through the effect of g on h,
as given by equation (4).
5
From equations (2), (4), and (5), the solution to the Romans' choice problem is
Because k 2 θω/4 is smaller than ω/θ only if the product of θ and k is smaller than two, equation (6) Substituting equations (4) and (6) into equation (2), we Þnd that, if the Romans send Legions to the country, then in equilibrium the probability that they will successfully incorporate the country into the Roman empire is
Equation (7) implies that, if and only if the product of θ and k is as large as two, in which case the Barbarians capitulate, then Q equals one. But, if θk is smaller than two, in which case the Barbarians resist, then Q is smaller the smaller is θk. Equation (7) also implies that, although Q depends on k, which is the ratio of Ω to ω, Q does not depend on the absolute value of ω, because in equilibrium both g and h are proportionate to ω.
5 Another consideration, which would give the Romans an incentive to choose g to be positive but smaller than ω/θ, could be that an Attempted Conquest, by demonstrating the effectiveness of Roman Legions, would increase the value of θ in future confrontations with Barbarians. The present analysis abstracts from this consideration.
Substituting equations (6) and (7) into equation (5), the expected value to the Romans of sending Legions to the country is
Equation (8) says that R C is larger the larger are θ, k and ω.
Roman Strategy
From equations (1) and (8) we can infer the conditions under which the Romans will use each of the three possible strategies. Figure 1 illustrates these results.
• Uncoerced Annexation: The Romans agree to compensate the Barbarians sufficiently to induce the Barbarians to agree to the annexation of their country by the Roman empire only if 0 < R A ≥ R C . Assuming, for simplicity, that R a equals (k −1)ω, equations (1) and (8) 
Coerced Annexation k: gain from imperial expansion θ: relative effectiveness of imperial armies
The Romans send Legions of sufficient size to induce the Barbarians to capitulate only if θk ≥ 2 and 0 < R C ≥ R A . Assuming that R a equals (k − 1)ω, equations (1) and (8) imply that these conditions are satisÞed if and only if
As we see in Figure 1 , condition (10) obtains if k is larger than two and θ is larger than one. If k is not larger than two, θ must be larger the smaller is k. This analysis implies that, if the Romans expect that the country will have substantial economic or military value as part of their empire, and if the Romans, and the Barbarians, anticipate that Roman
Legions are highly effective against the Barbarian defenses, then the Romans use a strategy of Coerced Annexation.
• Attempted Conquest: The Romans attack and try to conquer the country only if (1) and (8) imply that these conditions are satisÞed if and only if
As we see in Figure 1 , condition (11) obtains only if neither θ nor k are too large.
This analysis implies that the Romans attack and try to conquer a country only if the Romans, and the Barbarians, anticipate that Roman Legions are not too effective against the Barbarian defenses and only if the Romans do not expect that annexing the country would yield economic or military advantages that are too large. To understand this result, observe that equation (6) implies that, with small values of θ and k, although the Romans attack and try to conquer the country, they do not allocate as large an amount of resources to this effort as an alternative strategy of Coerced Annexation would require.
Conditions (9), (10), and (11) show how the Romans' choice of strategy depends on the parameters, θ and k. These conditions also reveal that the Romans' choice of strategy does not depend on the absolute value of ω, again because in equilibrium both g and h are proportionate to ω.
The Scope of Imperial Ambitions
In the preceding section, either condition (9), or condition (10), or condition (11) was satisÞed. Thus, this analysis implied that the Romans want to incorporate every Barbarian country into the Roman empire. This implication is counter factual.
In order to bound the scope of imperial ambitions, assume that the cost to the Romans of sending Legions of size g to the Barbarian country is not g, but c, where
The parameter f in equation (12) represents a Þxed cost of sending Legions.
The preceding analysis implicitly assumed that f equals zero. Because the value of f does not affect the marginal cost of sending Legions to the Barbarian country, equations (6) and (7) obtain whether or not f is positive. But, if f is positive, then equation (8) generalizes to
where
Equation (13) implies that R C is not positive if and only if (14) either θk < 2 and f/ω ≥ θk 2 /4 or θk ≥ 2 and f/ω ≥ (θk − 1)/θ.
.
Condition (14) is satisÞed for a combination of a sufficiently large value of the ratio, f/ω, and sufficiently small values of the parameters, k and θ. Thus, condition (14) Recall that equation (1) implies that R A is not positive if k is not larger than one.
Thus, if both k is not larger than one and condition (14) obtains, then neither R A nor R C is positive. Countries for which both k is not larger than one and condition (14) 
Liquidity Constraints
The preceding discussion has assumed implicitly that the Romans can mobilize sufficient resources to send to the Barbarian country Legions with a size that equals the value of g
given by equation (6). This assumption abstracts from the possibility that the Romans face a binding liquidity constraint on their ability to mobilize resources.
To relax this abstraction, let g denote the maximum amount of resources that the Romans can mobilize to send Legions to the Barbarian country. If condition (10) obtains, but g is smaller than ω/θ, which is the value of g that a strategy of Coerced Annexation requires, then g is a binding liquidity constraint. This constraint would prevent the Romans from using a strategy of Coerced Annexation that they otherwise would prefer. (2) and (4) into equation (5), and replacing g with g, we Þnd that the value of R C associated with g equal to g is k √ θgω − g. Gruen (1984) stress that these military advantages included enhanced ability both to defend the existing borders of their empire and to incorporate other desirable countries into their empire. As 26, 27 ) describes these advantages,
Since clients would take care to prevent attacks against provincial territory, their obedience lessened the need to provide local security at the periphery of the empire against low-intensity threats...Against high-intensity threats, such as invasions on a provincial or even a regional scale, client states and client tribes could contribute both their own interposed forces and their capacity to absorb the threat -in other words, they could provide geographic depth...Another obvious contribution of client states and client tribes to Roman security was the supply of local forces to augment Roman armies on campaign. Naturally, these troops would fall into the Roman category of auxilia, i.e., cavalry and light infantry, rather than legionary forces of heavy infantry...Auxiliary troops contributed by clients had played an important role in the campaigns of the republic, not least because they could provide military specialties missing from the regular Roman arsenal, such as archers, and especially mounted archers...The complementarity between auxilia and legionary forces was an important feature of the Roman military establishment; moreover, the forces maintained by the client states were substantial.
Also, many of these client states had relatively primitive economies, and incorporating these countries into the Roman empire resulted in large economic gains. With a small value of θ and a large value of k, our theory implies that the Romans would chose a strategy of Uncoerced Annexation.
How did the Romans compensate the rulers of their client states to induce them to agree to being annexed into the Roman empire? As Luttwak (pages 32, 37) tells us, conditionality was important.
Loyal and efficient client rulers were rewarded by personal honors, ordinarily re- well organized and encouraged; silver and gold work, pottery, iron implements and weapons, of extremely high quality, were produced for home consumption and export to the sophisticated Roman world in the south.
Because Dacia already was economically advanced, the economic gains associated with adding Dacia to the Roman empire apparently were not large enough to allow the Romans proÞtably to compensate the Dacians for agreeing to annexation. Instead, just as our theory implies, with neither θ nor k being large the Romans attempted to conquer Dacia, and eventually were successful. Note that in the case of Dacia k was not large because Dacia was already a rich country. Our analysis of the scope of imperial ambitions also seems to be consistent with Roman history. Luttwak (page 96) attributes the Roman decision not to incorporate Scotland into the Roman empire to the Scotland's being "inherently difficult to settle, urbanize, and Romanize". In addition, because of its location, annexation of Scotland was not attractive for geopolitical reasons. In the terms of our theory, Scotland apparently differed from the client states of central and northern Europe, Asia Minor, and the Middle East in that, in addition to θ being too small to make a strategy of either Coerced Annexation or Attempted Conquest attractive, k was too small to warrant a strategy of Uncoerced Annexation. Note that in the case of Scotland k was small because Scotland was hopelessly poor.
The Theory Applied to the History of The Mongol and Ottoman Empires
This analysis does not only offer insights into the building of the Roman empire. In his discussion of the expansion of the Mongol empire, E.L. Jones (1998, pages 108-115) suggests that the Mongols used mainly a strategy of Attempted Conquest, which was usually successful. The account provided by Jones also suggests that for the Mongols, with their superior technology of warfare and their effective terror tactics, θ was much larger than one. For example, according to Desmond Martin (1971) and Michel Hoang (1990) , between 1211 and 1215 an army of little more than 110,000 Mongols defeated an army of 500,000
Chinese and conquered the Chin Empire of Northern China. According to Martin and Leo de Hartog (1989) in 1223 a Mongol army of 20,000 decisively defeated a Russian army of 80,000 in the Battle of the River Khalka. As Martin writes (pages 11-12),
Whenever it is possible to obtain reliable information on the strength of Mongol forces, one Þnds that often they were heavily outnumbered by their enemies. We shall see that in 1211 Chingis Khan marched against the Chin with little more than 110,000 men -decidedly less than a quarter of the forces of his opponent.
During 1219 he mobilized perhaps 150,000 effectives for the war against the Khwarazm Shah. On that occasion, while the army opposed to him was neither quite so large -approximately 400,000 -or as well organized as that of the Chin, he had to march west nearly one thousand miles from his last home base before reaching the enemy's border. . . In the troops of Chingis Khan numerical inferiority, both on the battleÞeld and on campaign, was common.
Also, there seems to be no reason to presume that, even if it was not larger than one, the value of k associated with expansion of the Mongol empire typically was much smaller than one. Thus, abstracting from liquidity constraints, it would seem puzzling that the Mongols did not mainly use a strategy of Coerced Annexation. But, if for the Mongols g was a binding constraint, then this puzzle is solved.
Indeed there are other good reasons to think that the Mongols were subject to liquidity As our theory suggests, enjoying a larger θ in the Balkans, the Ottomans put aside the strategy of Uncoerced Annexation that they used in Anatolia.
The Theory Applied to Nazi Germany
Turning to modern times, our theory also can help us to understand the strategies that Nazi Germany used to build its empire. We focus on German territorial ambitions in central and eastern Europe. 11 On our reading of history, the Germans used a strategy of Coerced Annexation in taking over Austria and then the Sudetenland and the rest of Czechoslovakia, a successful strategy of Attempted Conquest of Poland, a strategy of Uncoerced Annexation in inducing Hungary and Romania to join the Axis alliance, and Þnally an unsuccessful strategy of Attempted Conquest of the Soviet Union. Our analysis implies that these differences in Nazi strategy resulted either from differences in θ or in k or from liquidity constraints.
Prior to the German annexation of Austria in March 1938, the existence of a substantial pro-Nazi faction within Austria undermined the ability of the Austrian leaders to resist Chamberlain felt committed to it on moral grounds, but he did not envisage the commitment leading to a confrontation with Germany. The French view was much the same. Bonnet and his political friends wanted an accord with Germany.
Halifax considered that they must avoid getting into a position in which Great
Britain and France might be called on to act against Germany and Italy.
Furthermore, after the Munich pact, the rest of Czechoslovakia laid almost defenseless to the German army. Shirer (pages 421-422) writes
The Þnal settlement of November 20, 1938, forced Czechoslovakia to cede to Germany 11,000 square miles of territory in which dwelt 2,800,000 Sudeten Germans and 800,000 Czechs. Within this area lay all the vast Czech fortiÞcations which hitherto had formed the most formidable defense line in Europe, with the possible exception of the Maginot Line in France.
When the Germans confronted Czechoslovakia in March 1939, again they had a large value of θ, and again they used a strategy of Coerced Annexation.
Now we come to Poland. Several factors suggest that, in confronting Poland, the Germans did not have a value of θ as large as they enjoyed in confronting Austria or Czechoslovakia.
First, the probability of an Allied intervention was higher than in the case of Austria or With θ in the case of Poland not being large enough to warrant a strategy of Coerced Annexation, and with k apparently not being large enough to warrant a strategy of Uncoerced Annexation, the Germans, as our theory predicts, used a strategy of Attempted Conquest.
In contrast to Poland, both Hungary and Romania provide examples of Uncoerced Annexation. The distinguishing feature of Hungary and Romania seems to be that k was large because annexation, which took the form of Hungary and Romania joining the Axis alliance under German leadership, offered large military advantages to the Germans. These advantages were both geopolitical and material. The Germans needed manpower in order to confront the Soviet Union, and the military forces of both Hungary and Romania would Þght, more or less effectively, along side of the Wehrmacht. In addition, the Germans coveted the Romanian oil Þelds.
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To induce the Hungarians and Romanians to join the Axis alliance, the Germans used policies similar to those that the Romans had used in annexing their client states. As a result of the First World War Hungary had lost territory and population, whereas Romania had gained territory and population. In the interwar period Hungarian policy focused on recovering its lost territory and population, whereas Romania was concerned with maintaining its gains. The Germans offered the Hungarians, as well as the Romanians, a share of the spoils of war. Jürgen Förster (1998, pages 412, 416, and 417) But, the Soviet Union had the ability to mobilize massive armed forces. Moreover, the Nazis were not yet in a position to demand large sacriÞces for the war effort. Rolf-Dieter Müller (1998, p. 187-188) writes
Once the euphoria of the early summer of 1940 had evaporated, it became obvious that Germany, while dominating large parts of the European continent, had not in fact achieved any abundance of material assets as a result. The performance of the German war economy was still considerably below the pre-war level...
Germany was unable to draw on any additional manpower reserves. Repeated demands from military quarters that greater use should be made of female labour were rejected by the political leadership. Any more intensive exploitation of the manpower potential was prevented not only by ideological and administrative obstacles, but also by a lack of enthusiasm for the war among broad circles of the population.
The high command of the German army calculated that "while the enemy would have approximately 155 divisions, German strength would be about the same". (Shirer, page 822 ).
Thus, even if θ was large enough to warrant a strategy of Coerced Annexation, liquidity constraints apparently prevented the Germans from using this strategy. Accordingly, as our theory suggests, the Nazi Empire chose a strategy of Attempted Conquest of the Soviet Union. From an ex-ante perspective this choice presumably was sound, albeit risky.
Unfortunately for the Germans, a combination of bad luck and unexpected Russian heroism caused Operation Barbarosa to fail.
Summary
This paper has developed an economic theory of empire building. This theory addresses the choice among three strategies that empire builders historically have used: Uncoerced Annexation, Coerced Annexation, and Attempted Conquest. Annexation, whether uncoerced or coerced, is peaceful, whereas Attempted Conquest involves the application of force.
Our theory views these strategies as merely different ways to achieve the goal of building a proÞtable empire in the most proÞtable way. In the famous words of the 19th century military strategist Carl von Clausewitz (1976, page 87) , "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means."
Our theory implies that the key factors in choosing among these strategies are the economic gains from imperial expansion, the anticipated relative effectiveness of imperial armies, the costs of projecting imperial military power, and liquidity constraints on Þnancing imperial armies. The theory also addressed the scope of imperial ambitions. The paper used historical examples from the Roman, Mongol, Ottoman, and Nazi German empires to illustrate the applicability of the theory.
We conjecture that the theory also would help us to understand the strategies used by other empire builders as well as the scope of their imperial ambitions. Applying the theory to the building of overseas empires by European powers from the 16th through the 19th centuries would seem to be an especially interesting extension, but we leave this exercise for another paper.
